This is mainly prelude to the "probability of causes where hume distinguishes three "species of probability (1) "imperfect experience where young children haven't observed enough to form any expectations, (2) "contrary causes where the same event has been observed to have different causes and effects. He focuses on the second species of probability (specifically reflective reasoning about a mixed body of observations offering a psychological explanation much like that of the probability of chances: we begin with the custom-based impulse to expect that the future will resemble the past, divide. Hume's discussion of probability finishes with a section on common cognitive biases, starting with recency effects. First, the more recent the event whose cause or effect we are looking for, the stronger our belief in the conclusion. Second, the more recent the observations we draw on, the stronger our belief in the conclusion. Third, the longer and more discontinuous a line of reasoning, the weaker our belief in the conclusion. Fourth, irrational prejudices can be formed by overgeneralizing from experience: the imagination is unduly influenced by any "superfluous circumstances" that have frequently been observed to accompany the circumstances that actually matter.
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Similarly, other kinds of custom-based conditioning (e.g., rote learning, repeated lying) can induce strong beliefs. Next, hume considers the mutual influence of belief and the passions, and of belief and the imagination. Only beliefs can have motivational influence: it is the additional force and vivacity of a belief (as opposed to a mere idea) that makes it "able to operate on the will and passions". And in turn we tend to favor beliefs that flatter our passions. Likewise, a story must be somewhat realistic or familiar to please the imagination, and an overactive imagination can result in delusional belief. Hume sees these diverse www phenomena as confirming his 'force and vivacity' account of belief. Indeed, we keep ourselves "from augmenting our belief upon every encrease of the force and vivacity of our ideas" only by soberly reflecting on past experience and forming "general rules" for ourselves. Probable reasoning in Treatise.3 Probable reasoning Probabilities Probability of causes Imperfect experience contrary causes Analogy In Part 3 of book 1, hume divides probable reasoning into different categories. Hume then examines probable reasoning under conditions of empirical uncertainty, distinguishing "proofs" (conclusive empirical evidence) from mere "probabilities" (less than conclusive empirical evidence). Beginning with a brief section on the "probability of chances he gives the example of a six-sided die, four sides marked one way and two sides marked another way: background causes lead us to expect the die to land with a side facing up, but.
Recall that one of the three is causation: thus when two objects are constantly conjoined in our experience, observing the one naturally leads us to form an idea of the other. This brings us to the third and final stage note of Hume's account, our belief in the other object as we conclude the process of probable reasoning (e.g., seeing wolf tracks and concluding confidently that they were caused by wolves). On his account of belief, the only difference between a believed idea and a merely conceived idea lies in the belief's additional force and vivacity. And there is a general psychological tendency for any lively perception to transfer some of its force and vivacity to any other perception naturally related to it (e.g., seeing "the picture of an absent friend" makes our idea of the friend more lively, by the. Thus in probable reasoning, on Hume's account, our lively perception of the one object not only leads us to form a mere idea of the other object, but enlivens that idea into a full-fledged belief. (This is only the simplest case: Hume also intends his account to explain probable reasoning without conscious reflection as well as probable reasoning based on only one observation.) Sections 913 edit hume now pauses for a more general examination of the psychology of belief. The other two natural relations (resemblance and contiguity) are too "feeble and uncertain" to bring about belief on their own, but they can still have a significant influence: their presence strengthens our preexisting convictions, they bias us in favor of causes that resemble their effects.
Second, we must make an inference, moving from our perception of this object to true an idea of another object: since the two objects are perfectly distinct from each other, this inference must draw on past experience of the two objects being observed together again and. (This "constant conjunction" is promptly filed alongside contiguity and priority, in Hume's still-developing account of our idea of causation.) But what exactly is the process by which we draw on past experience and make an inference from the present object to the other object? Here the famous " problem of induction " arises. Hume argues that this all-important inference cannot be accounted for by any process of reasoning: neither demonstrative reasoning nor probable reasoning. Not demonstrative reasoning: it cannot be demonstrated that the future will resemble the past, for "we can at least conceive a change in the course of nature in which the future significantly differs from the past. And not probable reasoning: that kind of reasoning itself draws on past experience, which means it presupposes that the future will resemble the past. In other words, in explaining how we draw on past experience to make causal inferences, we cannot appeal to a kind of reasoning that itself draws on past experience—that would be a vicious circle that gets us nowhere. The inference is not based on reasoning, hume concludes, but on the association of ideas : our innate psychological tendency to move along the three "natural relations".
All that can be observed in a single instance of cause and effect are two relations: contiguity in space, and priority in time. But Hume insists that our idea of causation also includes a mysterious necessary connection linking cause to effect. "Stopt short" by this problem, hume puts the idea of necessary connection on hold and examines two related questions: Why do we accept the maxim 'whatever begins to exist must have a cause'?, and How does the psychological process of probable reasoning work? Addressing the first question, hume argues that the maxim is not founded on intuition or demonstration (contending that we can at least conceive of objects beginning to exist without a cause and then rebuts four alleged demonstrations of the maxim. He concludes that our acceptance of this maxim must be somehow drawn "from observation and experience and thus turns to the second question. Sections 48 edit hume develops a detailed three-stage psychological account of how probable reasoning works (i.e., how "the judgment" operates). First, our senses or memory must present us with some object: our confidence in this perception (our "assent is simply a matter of its force and vivacity.
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With this diagnosis in hand, he replies to three objections from the vacuist camp—adding on a skeptical note that his "intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations but only "to explain the nature and. In the final section, hume accounts for our ideas of existence and of external existence. First, he argues that there is no distinct impression from which to derive the idea of existence. Instead, this idea is nothing more than the idea of any object, so that thinking of something integration and thinking of it as existent are the very same thing. Next, he argues that we cannot conceive of anything beyond our own perceptions; thus our conception of the existence of external objects is at most a "relative idea". Part 3: Of knowledge and probability edit sections 13 edit hume recalls the seven philosophical relations, and divides them into two classes : four which can give us "knowledge and certainty and three which cannot. (This division reappears in Hume's first Enquiry as " relations of ideas " and "matters of fact respectively.) As for the four relations, he notes, all can yield knowledge by way of intuition : immediate recognition of a relation (e.g., one idea as brighter.
But with one of the four, "proportions in quantity or number we commonly achieve knowledge by way of demonstration : step-by-step inferential reasoning (e.g., proofs in geometry). Hume makes two remarks on demonstrative reasoning in mathematics: that geometry is not as precise as algebra (though still generally reliable and that mathematical ideas are not "spiritual and refin'd perceptions but instead copied from impressions. Knowledge and probability Immediate Inferential Relations of ideas intuition demonstrative reasoning Matters of fact perception probable reasoning As for the other three relations, two of them (identity and space/time) are simply a matter of immediate sensory perception (e.g., one object next to another). But with the last relation, causation, we can go beyond the senses, by way of a form of inferential reasoning he calls probable reasoning. Here hume embarks on his celebrated examination of causation, beginning with the question From what impression do we derive our idea of causation?
Part 2: Of the ideas of space and time edit hume's "system concerning space and time" features two main doctrines: the finitist doctrine that space and time are not infinitely divisible, and the relationist doctrine that space and time cannot be conceived apart from objects. Hume begins by arguing that, since "the capacity of the mind is limited our imagination and senses must eventually reach a minimum: ideas and impressions so minute as to be indivisible. And since nothing can be more minute, our indivisible ideas are "adequate representations of the most minute parts of spatial extension". Upon consideration of these "clear ideas hume presents a few arguments to demonstrate that space and time are not infinitely divisible, but are instead composed of indivisible points. On his account, the idea of space is abstracted from our sense experience (arrangements of colored or tangible points and the idea of time from the changing succession of our own perceptions.
And this means that space and time cannot be conceived on their own, apart from objects arranged in space or changing across time. Thus we have no idea of absolute space and time, so that vacuums and time without change are ruled out. Hume then defends his two doctrines against objections. In defending his finitism against mathematical objections, he argues that the definitions of geometry actually support his account. He then argues that since important geometric ideas (equality, straightness, flatness) do not have any precise and workable standard beyond common observation, corrective measurements, and the "imaginary" standards we are naturally prone to fabricate, it follows that the extremely subtle geometric demonstrations of infinite divisibility. Next, hume defends his relationist doctrine, critically examining the alleged idea of a vacuum. No such idea can be derived from our experience of darkness or motion (alone or accompanied by visible or tangible objects but it is indeed this experience that explains why we mistakenly think we have the idea: according to hume, we confuse the idea.
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Here hume finds three "natural relations" guiding the imagination: resemblance, paper contiguity, and causation. But the imagination remains free to compare ideas along any of seven "philosophical relations resemblance, identity, space/time, quantity/number, quality/degree, contrariety, and causation. Hume finishes this discussion of complex ideas with a skeptical account of our ideas of substances and modes : though both are nothing more than collections of simple ideas associated together by the imagination, the idea of a substance also involves attributing either a fabricated. Hume finishes Part 1 by arguing (following Berkeley ) that so-called ' abstract ideas ' are in fact only particular ideas used in a general way. First, he makes a three-point case against pelleas indeterminate ideas of quantity or quality, insisting on the impossibility of differentiating or distinguishing a line's length from the line itself, the ultimate derivation of all ideas from fully determinate impressions, and the impossibility of indeterminate objects. Second, he gives a positive account of how abstract thought actually works: once we are accustomed to use the same term for a number of resembling items, hearing this general term will call up some particular idea and activate the associated custom, which disposes the. Thus the general term 'triangle' both calls up an idea of some particular triangle and activates the custom disposing the imagination to call up any other ideas of particular triangles. Finally, hume uses this account to explain so-called "distinctions of reason" (e.g., distinguishing the motion of a body from the body itself). Though such distinctions are strictly impossible, hume argues, we achieve the same effect by noting the various points of resemblance between different objects.
Since the simple impressions come before the simple ideas, and since those without functioning senses (e.g., blindness) end up lacking the corresponding ideas, hume concludes that simple ideas must be derived from simple impressions. Notoriously, hume considers and dismisses the ' missing shade of blue ' counterexample. Perceptions in Treatise.1 Perceptions Impressions Impressions of sensation Impressions of reflection Ideas writer Ideas of the memory Ideas of the imagination In Part 1 of book 1, hume divides mental perceptions into different categories. The simple/complex distinction, which may apply to perceptions in all categories, is not pictured. Briefly examining impressions, hume then distinguishes between impressions of sensation (found in sense experience) and impressions of reflection (found mainly in emotional experience only to set aside any further discussion for book 2's treatment of the passions. Returning to ideas, hume finds two key differences between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination: the former are more forceful than the latter, and whereas the memory preserves the "order and position" of the original impressions, the imagination is free to separate. But despite this freedom, the imagination still tends to follow general psychological principles as it moves from one idea to another: this is the " association of ideas ".
intellectual progress. So hume hopes "to explain the principles of human nature thereby "proposing a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security." But an a priori psychology would be hopeless. This means we must rest content with well-confirmed empirical generalizations, forever ignorant of "the ultimate original qualities of human nature". And in the absence of controlled experiments, we are left to "glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs. Edit hume begins by arguing that each simple idea is derived from a simple impression, so that all our ideas are ultimately derived from experience: thus Hume accepts concept empiricism and rejects the purely intellectual and innate ideas found in rationalist philosophy. Hume's doctrine draws on two important distinctions: between impressions (the forceful perceptions found in experience, "all our sensations, passions and emotions and ideas (the faint perceptions found in "thinking and reasoning and between complex perceptions (which can be distinguished into simpler parts) and simple perceptions. Our complex ideas, he acknowledges, may not directly correspond to anything in experience (e.g., we can form the complex idea of a heavenly city). But each simple idea (e.g., of the color red) directly corresponds to a simple impression resembling it—and this regular correspondence suggests that the two are causally connected.
Hume defends a sentimentalist account of morality, arguing that ethics is based on sentiment and passion rather than reason, and famously declaring that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave to the passions". Hume also offers a skeptical theory of personal identity and a compatibilist account of free will. Contemporary philosophers have written of Hume that "no man has influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper pdf or more disturbing degree 2 and that Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science " 3 and the "most important philosophical work written in English.". Britain at the time did not agree, and the, treatise was a commercial failure. Deciding that the, treatise had problems of style rather than of content, hume reworked some of the material for more popular consumption. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748) and, an Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751 which Hume wrote is "of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." 4 Contents Content edit Introduction edit hume's introduction presents the idea of placing all science. He begins by acknowledging "that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings. E., any complicated and difficult argumentation a prejudice formed in reaction to "the present imperfect condition of the sciences" (including the endless scholarly disputes and the inordinate influence of "eloquence" over reason). But since the truth "must lie very deep and abstruse" where "the greatest geniuses" have not found it, careful reasoning is still needed.
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A Treatise of story Human Nature (173840) is a book by Scottish philosopher. David Hume, considered by many to be hume's most important work and one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy. 1, the, treatise is a classic statement of philosophical empiricism, skepticism, and naturalism. In the introduction Hume presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a novel foundation: namely, an empirical investigation into human nature. Impressed by, isaac Newton 's achievements in the physical sciences, hume sought to introduce the same experimental method of reasoning into the study of human psychology, with the aim of discovering the "extent and force of human understanding". Against the philosophical rationalists, hume argues that passion rather than reason governs human behaviour. He introduces the famous problem of induction, arguing that inductive reasoning and our beliefs regarding cause and effect cannot be justified by reason; instead, our faith in induction and causation is the result of mental habit and custom.